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1Abstract
In early 2003, two panels of the Federal Circuit clashed in a pair of cases (Warner-Lambert
v. Apotex and Allergan v. Alcon) dealing with the question of whether an action for
inducement of infringement could be leveled against a generic drug manufacturer seeking
FDA approval for an unpatented drug with both patented and unpatented uses. This paper
takes up this debate, analyzing the interpretive puzzles presented in the application of the
intricate Hatch-Waxman Act to this set of facts, arguing that the correct interpretation
weaves elements from both panels’ approaches. It ﬁnishes with an alternative solution
borrowed from a lesson in copyright.
If the Second Amendment had a penumbra, it might look something like, “The People have a right to objects
that can potentially be put to bad purposes.”1 The problem is ﬁguring out what the scope of that right
ought to be — how to maximize the beneﬁts of use and minimize the harms of abuse. The question is as old
as guns,2 as new as digital video,3 and sometimes as silly as martini-olive transmitters4 and aluminum-lined
backpacks.5 Of course, it applies to drugs. And more and more, it is confounding consumers and corpora-
tions alike in the context of intellectual property.
Consider, for example, a pair of high-proﬁle copyright cases from the last twenty years in which the question
was squarely faced in decisions that ultimately came down in opposing directions. First, in Sony v. Univer-
sal, a bare majority of the Supreme Court held that Sony Corporation could not be held contributorily liable
for the sale of the VCR, since the device was “capable of... substantial noninfringing use.”6 In other words,
the Supreme Court was willing to curtail some rights of copyright holders so as to protect “fair uses rights”
for those who would utilize VCRs for legitimate purposes. In A&M Records v. Napster, however, a panel of
1See U.S. Const. amend. II (“A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people
to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
2Id.
3Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001) (enjoining an online site from distributing software
capable of cracking access protection technologies embedded in DVDs in order to make copies of movies).
4See S. Rep. No. 90-351 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2183 (describing provisions of Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 banning trade in wiretapping and eavesdropping devices, including “the
microphone disguised as a wristwatch, picture frame, cuﬀ link, tie clip, fountain pen, stapler, or cigarette pack”).
5Miss. Code § 97-23-93.1; R.I. Code § 11-63-1; Col. Code § 18-4-417; N.H. Code § 637:10-a (regulating “theft detection
shielding devices” and “theft detection device removers” that may be used to facilitate theft of electronically-tagged goods from
stores).
6Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
2the Ninth Circuit upheld an order mandating the complete shut down of the Napster ﬁle-swapping system,
ﬁnding that it was appropriate to force Napster to entirely disable its service until copyright violations could
be prevented with exacting precision.7 In other words, the court was willing to provide broader protection
than that provided under copyright law (stiﬂing some uses of the Napster system that were perfectly legal)
in order to preserve at a minimum the protection oﬀered to copyright holders under that law.
In the context of patent law, the contours of a similar compromise have been drawn by statute. Section
271(c) of Title 35 of the U.S. Code provides that the marketing of a device capable of patented uses may be
sold without fear of infringement liability, so long as the device has some “substantial noninfringing use.”8
Additionally, § 271(b) imposes liability for sale of devices with substantial noninfringing uses (notwithstand-
ing § 271(c)) in those cases where the seller knowingly encourages those who buy the device to use it in
ways that will infringe method patents.9 While these laws apply in all sorts of ways to all diﬀerent kinds of
patents, they do not apply, in certain circumstances, to pharmaceutical drugs. Herein lies the puzzle this
paper presents.
The puzzle takes the form of a hypothetical. A pharmaceutical company develops a drug and patents both
the drug and its use in treating disease X. The company obtains FDA approval for the drug, and rapidly
develops both a healthy reputation in the medical community and a successful market. Through subsequent
research, the company discovers that the drug is also eﬀective in treating disease Y, and secures a third
patent for its use to that end.
When the ﬁrst two patents are about to expire, a competitor seeks FDA approval to manufacture and market
a generic version of the drug. It is virtually certain, however, that if the generic version goes on the market,
it will be prescribed by physicians, distributed by pharmacists, and ingested by patients, all for the purpose
7A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
835 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2003). The Sony court borrowed the “substantial noninfringing use” standard from this statute. Sony,
464 U.S. at 440.
935 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2003).
3of treating disease Y. Such use would, of course, be infringement of the third patent obtained by the ﬁrst
pharmaceutical company.
The question then arises: should the second generic manufacturer be precluded from creating the generic
version of the drug in order to forestall infringement by unrelated third parties? On the one hand, it would
be unfair to allow the second manufacturer to reap the beneﬁts of the research and expense for which the
ﬁrst company was awarded its third patent. On the other hand, it would also be unfair to completely block
competition in the drug after the expiration of the ﬁrst two patents, since doing so would eﬀectively extend
the life of those patents beyond the term ﬁxed under patent law.
Sections 271(b) and (c) have an answer to the question, of course. Production and sale of the drug is legal
under § 271(b), since it is clearly capable of noninfringing uses. Sale of the drug is legal under § 271(c) as
well, with the caveat that the generic manufacturer must not do anything to encourage its purchasers to use
the drug to treat disease Y, or else the generic manufacturer will be liable for inducing infringement. Of
course, drawing a line between “sale” and “sale plus encouragement” is a tricky question in its own right.10
But in this particular situation, the problem is made manifestly more diﬃcult due to the fact that in the
context of FDA approval of drugs, patent rights are governed by what is known as the Hatch-Waxman Act
— a complex scheme of laws designed to correct many of the special problems in patent that arise as a
function of FDA regulation of (often patented) drugs.11
The intricacy of this scheme was highlighted recently in another pair of high-proﬁle cases, this time before
separate panels of the Federal Circuit. Warner-Lambert v. Apotex12 and Allergan v. Alcon13 both analyzed
105 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 17.04 (2003) (examining doctrine of inducement of infringement and reviewing
cases).
11Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
12316 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
132003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6003 (Fed. Cir. March 28, 2003) (per curiam).
4a set of facts virtually identical to those presented in the hypothetical earlier, both applied Hatch-Waxman,
and yet they came to diametrically opposing conclusions. The latter of the panels (Allergan) applied (as it
was obliged to do) in a per curiam decision the precedent-setting reasoning of the ﬁrst (Warner-Lambert).14
Then, in a highly unusual move, all three members of the panel concurred in opinions criticizing the prece-
dent, explaining in detail why they would have handed down the exact opposite decision were they not bound
by the opinion of the Warner-Lambert panel.15
This paper is an attempt to resolve their debate in anticipation of the inevitable en banc review. Part I
presents a review of the history of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its general operation in practice. Part II ana-
lyzes three issues of contention between the Federal Circuit panels, the third and foremost of which presents
the ultimate question of whether Hatch-Waxman permits an action for infringement in the hypothetical
detailed above. Part III concludes with a summary policy analysis of the outcome ultimately proposed.
I.
The Act: Hatch-Waxman
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act (after the names of its principal sponsors), represented a compromise between pioneer and
generic drug manufacturers who were both unsatisﬁed with what they saw as undesirable side eﬀects of the
combination of the extant laws governing drug approval and patents. Pioneer drug manufacturers (“pio-
14Id. at *5.
15Id. at *36 (Schall, J., concurring); id. at *68 (Linn, J., concurring). Judge Clevenger joined Judge Schall’s concurring
opinion. Id. at *1.
5neers”) had been complaining that the prolonged regulatory review required by the 1962 amendments to
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act eﬀectively and substantially diminished the length of the term of any
patent associated with the drug.16 Since patents on drugs were often already issued by the time regulatory
review ﬁrst began, “the ‘clock’ on [the] patent term [would] be running even though [the pioneer would] not
yet [be] able to derive any proﬁt from the invention.”17
At the same time, generic drug manufacturers (“generics”) had been griping about the eﬀects of the premar-
ket approval requirements at the other end of the patent term, especially in light of a 1984 case handed down
by the Federal Circuit, Roche v. Bolar.18 In Roche, a patentee had sued a generic drug manufacturer that
had started producing small amounts of a drug covered by the patent that was going to expire within the
next six months, in order to start performing the tests required to be able to submit a New Drug Application
(NDA) to FDA, as was required before the company could market the drug. The generic company contended
that while such “use” might fall under a literal reading of the patent infringement statute,19 the court should
ﬁnd the activity excepted under the traditional “experimental use exception” created at common law.20 Al-
ternatively, the company argued that “public policy favors generic drugs and thus mandates the creation of
a new exception in order to allow FDA required drug testing.”21
The court rejected these arguments and held the generic company liable for patent infringement. Incensed
at the fact that “the combined eﬀect of the patent law and the premarket regulatory approval requirement...
create[d] an eﬀective extension of the [pioneers’] patent term[s],”22 the generics immediately demanded a
legislative ﬁx. They found a champion in Henry Waxman of the House of Representatives, who urged that
16See Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 580 (2d ed. 1991)
(discussing the “drug lag.” resulting from the 1962 Drug Amendments).
17Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1990).
18733 F.2d 858 (1984).
1935 U.S.C. § 271(a) provides that “whoever without authority makes, uses, oﬀers to sell, or sells any patented invention...
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”
20Roche, 733 F.2d at 862.
21Id.
22Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 670.
6Roche be overruled through the addendum of a set of provisions to a patent term extension bill that had
already cleared the Senate.23 The compromise legislation was quickly engineered, and the result was the
1984 Hatch-Waxman Act.
Central to the practical import of the Act was the streamlining of the abbreviated NDA (ANDA) procedure
through which generic counterparts to already-authorized pioneer drugs could obtain FDA approval, a pro-
cedure that has remained roughly the same for the nearly twenty years since the passage of the Act. Perhaps
the most critical change is that now a generic drug manufacturer desiring to obtain FDA approval for a new
generic version of an existing drug need not show safety and eﬀectiveness of the generic version, but rather
only its bioavailability and bioequivalence to the pioneer drug.24 Moreover, the statutory language overruling
Roche makes it clear that experimental tests on a patented drug performed to collect data required by the
ANDA procedure (e.g., to show bioequivalence) will not constitute infringement of the patents associated
with the drug.25
Yet while generic manufacturers enjoy this safe harbor for the purposes of drug testing, they are not permit-
ted to avoid the patent confrontation indeﬁnitely. With the actual ﬁling of the ANDA to FDA, the generic
company is generally required to submit a patent “certiﬁcation” declaring the existence and application of
certain patents associated with the relevant pioneer drug.26 To assist the generic manufacturer in making
this declaration, holders of NDAs for pioneer drugs are required to identify and register with FDA all known
patents that claim those drugs or uses of those drugs for which NDAs were ﬁled.27 This list of patent
information is, in turn, complied by FDA and made publicly available in the so-called “Orange Book.”
The ANDA applicant is generally required to submit one certiﬁcation for each of the patents associated with
23Gerald J. Mossinghoﬀ, Striking the Right Balance Between Innovation and Drug Price Competition: Understanding the
Hatch-Waxman Act: Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 Food Drug
L.J. 187 (1999).
24Hutt & Merrill, supra note 16, at 571.
2535 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
2621 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
2721 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
7the pioneer drug corresponding to the proposed generic version for which approval is sought. For each such
patent, the applicant must state one of the following: “(I) that the patent information has not been ﬁled
[e.g., it is not in the Orange Book], (II) that such patent has expired, (III)... the date on which such patent
will expire, or (IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of
the new drug for which the application is submitted.”28 In the ﬁrst or second cases, the ANDA may be
approved by FDA immediately; in the third, it may be approved on a date not before the patent expiration
date given.29
The last sort of certiﬁcation, often referred to as a “Paragraph IV certiﬁcation,” may generate a much more
complex sequence of events, as detailed in the statute. First, an ANDA applicant submitting a Paragraph
IV certiﬁcation is required to give notice of the certiﬁcation to both the patent holder as well as the holder of
the NDA for the corresponding pioneer drug, including “a detailed statement of the factual and legal basis
of the applicant’s opinion that the patent is not valid or will not be infringed.”30 If the parties notiﬁed do
not do take any further action for forty-ﬁve days after receipt of the notice, the ANDA may be approved
immediately.31 If, however, a claim for patent infringement is brought against the ANDA applicant within
the forty-ﬁve day window, then FDA approval will automatically be withheld for thirty months, barring a
decision before that time by the court where suit is brought that the patent is or is not infringed.32
To ensure that just such a judicial determination is possible, the Act explicitly states that it “shall be an
act of infringement to submit an [ANDA] for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a
patent, if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval under such Act to engage in the commercial
manufacture, use, or sale of a drug... before the expiration of such patent.”33 Of course, on its face, such
2821 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). With respect to Paragraph I, see Allergan, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6003, at 61 n.12.
2921 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B).
3021 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B).
3121 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
32Id.
3335 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
8a deﬁnition of infringement would seem to encompass, at the very least, any act of ﬁling an ANDA with a
Paragraph IV certiﬁcation, since the very nature of the certiﬁcation indicates that the applicant intends to
“engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug... before the expiration of [the corresponding]
patent.”34
The courts have declined to thus interpret the infringement provision as a “strict liability statute,”35 saving
the provision from this absurd result by reading it as prohibiting only the submission of an ANDA “that is
in error as to whether commercial manufacture, use, or sale... [will] violate[] the relevant patent.”36 The
Federal Circuit has held that a court’s inquiry in a suit brought under § 271(e)(2) is, in essence, “the same
as it is in any other infringement suit, viz., whether the patent in question is ‘invalid or will not be infringed
by the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug for which the [ANDA] is submitted.”’37
While such an inquiry is in a sense “highly artiﬁcial,”38 since its focus is on a product that “has not yet
been made, used, or sold,”39 in fact, the whole point of the infringement action is to create “a jurisdictional
construct to enable patentees to get into court quickly before a potentially infringing product gets out into
the market.”40 Such a goal is, of course, part of the general compromise of the Act that aims to allow
generic companies to roll out products quickly when pioneer drug patent terms expire, while still providing
assurance to patentees that rights in those patents that remain extant will be protected.
34Id. See Organon Inc. v. Teva Pharms., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 370, 378 (D.N.J. 2002) (noting that the “literal wording of
§ 271(e)(2) of the Hatch-Waxman Act... states that it shall be an act of infringement to ﬁle an ANDA with a paragraph IV
certiﬁcation”); Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1227 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (stating that the “literal reading of
the statute is naturally problematic, as it would. . . appear to exclude traditional defenses such as invalidity and non-infringing
use”).
35Allergan, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6003, at *35 n.6; Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1355 (rejecting the argument that “the
mere ﬁling of an ANDA for a drug having a use claimed in a patent is an infringing act per se”).
36Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 678.
37Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
38Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 678.
39Glaxo, 110 F.3d at 1569.
40Organon, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
9II.
The Debate: A Circuit, Split
The Hatch-Waxman Act is a truly ambitious piece of legislation, and in many respects has fulﬁlled well its
purposes. But it has been a bumpy ride. Courts and commentators often quote the critique that appears in
Eli Lilly: “No interpretation we have been able to imagine can transform § 271(e)(1) into an elegant piece
of statutory draftsmanship.”41 The general feeling is that the critique is not only well earned, but is appro-
priately applied to the Act as a whole. One example of the drafting imprecision has just been discussed: the
plain but diﬃcult language of the new patent infringement provision.42 But while that interpretive move
was made without much notice or controversy, not all of the puzzles of Hatch-Waxman have fared so well.
This is nowhere better seen than in the sharply contrasting decisions in Warner-Lambert and Allergan. This
Part takes up three particularly knotty issues raised in those two cases, and tries to draw some conclusions
about the correct answer to the problem posed in the beginning, in light of the most reasonable interpretation
of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
A.
The Listing Provisions
Pioneer drug manufacturers are required, as part of the NDA process, to submit patent information to FDA
according to § 355(b)(1):
41Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 679.
4235 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
10The applicant shall ﬁle with the application the patent number and the expiration date of any patent
which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the application or which claims a method
of using such drug and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be
asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.
The statute goes on to explicitly state, in § 355(c)(2), that patents obtained post-NDA-approval should also
be ﬁled with FDA. Do § 355(b) and (c) require the ﬁling of those patents associated with uses of a drug
that are not covered by an NDA? The question is a critical one, since other portions of the statute (the
patent certiﬁcation provision, for one) attach certain consequences depending on whether such patents are
“required to be ﬁled under subsection (b) and (c).”43
Warner-Lambert suggests that the answer is no. For support, the court places emphasis on the last part of
the provision, “with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted,” taking
this to mean only “relevant patents” may be ﬁled.44 The Warner-Lambert panel also relies heavily on 21
C.F.R. § 314.53, an FDA regulation that clearly mandates that only use patents that claim a use approved
under an NDA may be ﬁled for inclusion in the Orange Book.45 Indeed, FDA has made it clear that they
agree with the more restrictive reading of § 355(b) that Warner-Lambert adopts here.46
Judge Schall, however, takes the opposite position in his Allergan concurrence, (joined by Judge Clevenger).
4321 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
44Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1361.
45Id. at 1361 n.6 (“For patents that claim a method of use, the FDA regulations state that ‘the applicant shall submit
information only on those patents that claim indications or other conditions of use of a pending or approved application.”’)
(citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)). The district court in Allergan took the same position. See Allergan, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1230
n.9.
46Proposed Rule, Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Listing Requirements and Application of
30-Month Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug Applications Certifying That a Patent Claiming a Drug Is Invalid or
Will Not be Infringed, 67 Fed. Reg. 65448, 65452 (October 24, 2002) (noting that under both the existing rule and its proposed
amendment, “patents that claim methods of use
that are not approved for the listed drug or are not the subject of a pending application may not be submitted [for inclusion in
the Orange Book]”). For this reason it is perhaps curious that the Allergan defendants attempted to argue that the proposed
rule amendment provided additional support for their narrow interpretation of § 355(b), since the amendment would not seem
to either add or take away support for their position. See Allergan, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6003, at *54 n.10.
11Judge Schall ﬁrst notes that the plain statutory language states that “any patent... which claims a method
of using [the] drug” should be ﬁled,47 and that there is no explicit limitation that the method of using the
drug be the one approved in the original NDA.48 With regard to the FDA rule, he notes that it should be
construed, if at all possible, so as to be consistent with (his reading of) the statute: “A court is properly
reluctant to embrace a reading of a regulation that makes the regulation conﬂict with the statute that it is
meant to implement.”49 He ultimately ﬁnds it capable of such a construction. Furthermore, Judge Schall
expresses reluctance to rely on the proceedings of a proposed rulemaking that would make it even clearer
that the FDA rule bars submission of non-controlling use patents.50
Surely Judge Schall is correct that an agency’s interpretation cannot override the clear language of a statute;
under Chevron, a reviewing “court, as well as [an] agency, must give eﬀect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.”51 The question is whether § 355(b) can indeed be considered unambiguous. Judge
Schall’s explication suggests that it is. By contrast, Warner-Lambert’s reliance on the phrase “with respect
to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted” smacks of circularity, for the issue
of whether or not all related use patents should be submitted to FDA (including those disclosing uses not
approved in the original NDA) bears on the very question of whether a patentee will be able to sue for
infringement. To state that NDA applicants are required to list only “relevant patents” is to beg the ques-
tion of “relevance.” In contrast, Judge Schall’s interpretation is clearly grounded in the text of the statute.
Section 355(b) must therefore be interpreted as requiring submission of all valid patents claiming methods
47Allergan, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6003, at *48 (Schall, J., concurring) (emphasis added in opinion).
48Id. at *50 (Schall, J., concurring).
49Id. at *53 (Schall, J., concurring). Judge Schall cites Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 484 (2001)
and Gomez v. Dept. of Air Force, 869 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 1989) to support his argument here. Id. at *52-*53 (Schall, J.,
concurring).
50Id. at *54 (Schall, J., concurring), quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845 (“It goes
without saying that a proposed regulation does not represent an agency’s considered interpretation of its statute and that an
agency is entitled to consider alternative interpretation before settling on the view it considers most sound.”).
51Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984). See also FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125-126 (2000) (ﬁnding that FDA did not have statutory authority to regulate
tobacco products, notwithstanding their attempts through rulemaking to do so).
12of using a drug that is the subject of an associated NDA.52
B.
The Certiﬁcation Provision
The provision governing patent certiﬁcation, on the other hand, is much less straightforward. The text of §
355(j)(2)(A)(vii) runs thus:
[An ANDA shall contain] a certiﬁcation... with respect to each patent which claims the listed drug...
or which claims a use for such listed drug for which the applicant is seeking approval under this
subsection and for which information is required to be ﬁled under subsection (b) or (c) of this
section....
The principal ambiguity of the language has to do with the phrase “for which the applicant is seeking
approval.” Does the statute require certiﬁcation for patents that claim uses (of a drug) for which the
applicant is seeking approval? Or does it require certiﬁcation for patents that claim uses of a drug for which
the applicant is seeking approval?
The immediate context of the provision suggests one mode of clariﬁcation. The following paragraph, §
355(j)(2)(A)(viii) states that
if information was ﬁled under subsection (b) or (c) of this section for a method of use patent which
does not claim a use for which the applicant is seeking approval under this subsection, [then the
ANDA applicant must submit] a statement [to that eﬀect].
52One court has noted that notwithstanding the FDA rule, “it is common for pioneers to list any and every patent they can
obtain in the Orange Book so as to force generic manufacturers to ﬁle paragraph IV certiﬁcations.” Organon v. Mylan, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24219, at *12 n.6 (D.N.J. December 18, 2002). The court adds that “FDA does not appear to have policed
this practice.” Id. On the other hand, it is also clear that “[l]isting in the ‘Orange Book’ is entitled to no presumption about
the validity of the drug or patent owner’s claims, and is a ministerial act on the part of the FDA.” Allergan, 200 F. Supp. 2d
at 1223.
13A reading of these two provisions in succession suggests that they are intended to be complementary, es-
pecially given the parallel inverse phrases “for which the applicant is/is not seeking approval.” In other
words, since it is clear that the second paragraph (viii) refers to the case of a patent claiming a method of
use for which the ANDA applicant is not seeking approval, then it would seem reasonable to assume that
the ﬁrst paragraph (vii) is meant to exclude that case.53 The Warner-Lambert panel appears to adopt this
interpretation, implying that the two paragraphs are indeed meant to be mutually exclusive.54 Other courts
have adopted this stance even more explicitly,55 as has FDA: “The two provisions of the statute [paragraphs
(vii) and (viii)] do not overlap.”56
A closer look at the language of the statute, however, reveals several complexities that must be addressed
before arriving at a deﬁnitive conclusion. First, it seems peculiar that paragraphs (vii) and (viii) would
be connected with the conjunctive “and” rather than the disjunctive “or” if they were truly intended to be
mutually exclusive.57 Would it not have made more sense for Congress to have combined the two possibilities
into a single statutory element if the Warner-Lambert interpretation were correct? On the other hand, the
mere fact that Congress might have drafted the provision more clearly is not exactly convincing aﬃrmative
evidence of an alternative reading; after all, if Congress intended the opposite interpretation, it could just
as easily be argued that they should have made the language clearer to that end.
53The plaintiﬀ in Warner-Lambert tried to turn this analysis on its head by arguing that the interposition in section (vii) of
the words “for such listed drugs” within the phrase “use for which the applicant is seeking approval” indicates that the similar
phrases in sections (vii) and (viii) cannot be considered complementary. Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1362. The court rightly
rejected the argument as “unconvincing.” Id. Clearly the interposition of “for such listed drugs” results from the fact that
section (vii) applies to patents on both drugs and uses. Since section (viii) deals only with uses, there would be no reason for
it to also interpose the phrase “for such listed drugs.”
54Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1362 (noting that for a drug with multiple approved indications, an ANDA applicant might
have to certify some patents under subsection (vii) and others under subsection (viii)).
55See, e.g., Purepac v. Thompson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24219, at *11 (D.D.C. December 16, 2002) (noting that under
certain circumstance, the “ANDA applicant need not ﬁle a patent certiﬁcation under [section (vii)]; instead, the ANDA must
include a statement [under (viii)] that the method of use patent at issue does not claim the use of the drug for which the
applicant is seeking approval”).
56Letter from Gary Buehler of FDA to Apotex and Purepac, January 28, 2003, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/
ogd/75350.479pat.pdf.
57See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (stating that an ANDA shall contain a certiﬁcation under (vii), if applicable, “and” a statement
under (viii), if applicable). But see Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1362 (rejecting this argument).
14Second, the Allergan concurrence claims additional textual support for an opposing interpretation in the
parallel phrases “for which” in paragraph (vii).58 The implications of such a reading is made clear by aligning
the clauses like so:
[An ANDA shall contain] a certiﬁcation... with respect to each patent...
which claims a use for such listed drug
[1] for which the applicant is seeking approval under this subsection and
[2] for which information is required to be ﬁled under subsection (b)....
The second clause must be understood as applying to the word “drug,” Judge Schall contends, because §
355(b) sets forth the list of data regarding the drug for which the NDA applicant is applying.59 If the second
clause is anchored to “drug,” then it should be expected that the ﬁrst clause would also be so anchored,
so as to be consistent with the “parallel construction of the sentence.”60 However, while it certainly seems
true that the two clauses must attach to the same word, it would appear that, in fact, the second clause
could just as plausibly be read as connecting to “use” rather than to “drug,” since one of the things § 355(b)
requires to be submitted is a list of patents governing uses of a drug, as discussed in Section A, above.
Third, Judge Schall asserts that the Warner-Lambert interpretation of § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) would lead to a
“distorted interpretation” of § 355(b): why would NDA applicants be required to ﬁle all use patents with
FDA if only some of them generated certiﬁcation requirements under section (vii)?61 The likely response is
that while some such patents would be listed in the Orange Book to put generic companies on notice for the
purposes of the section (vii) certiﬁcation, the others could be understood as putting the same companies on
notice for the purposes of the section (viii) statement.
58Allergan, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6003, at *56-*58 (Schall, J., concurring).
59Id. at *57 (Schall, J., concurring).
60Id. (Schall, J., concurring).
61Id. at *61-*62 (Schall, J., concurring).
15A ﬁnal argument in opposition to the mutual exclusivity interpretation has to do with the implications
of that interpretation within the larger context of the Act. An examination of the surrounding statutory
provisions reveals that the ﬁling of the certiﬁcation under § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) is central to the entire complex
operation of the ANDA proceeding. Proceedings involving Paragraph VI certiﬁcations, of course, are sub-
ject to special procedures under this scheme, such as the requirement of notice to be sent to patentees and
NDA holders62 and the 180-day period of marketing exclusivity for ﬁrst-time ﬁlers.63 But all four types of
certiﬁcation are subject to a separate provision regulating timing of ANDA approval, depending on the type
of certiﬁcation submitted (as detailed in Part I).64 That provision could be read as evidence that Congress
imagined that all ANDA applicants would submit some sort of certiﬁcation under section (vii) — even if
only to state that there were no existing patents or no patents that applied to that particular ANDA (i.e.,
a Paragraph I certiﬁcation).65 But such a reading would ultimately require only a minor adjustment to the
Warner-Lambert interpretation of section (vii), the implication being that while the two provisions are not
mutually exclusive, a section (viii) statement should always be accompanied by a Paragraph I certiﬁcation,
essentially stating that section (vii) does not apply to the particular ANDA under consideration. This would
avoid any unnecessary ambiguities regarding timing of approval that might accrue were section (viii) state-
ments understood as precluding the need to ﬁle a certiﬁcation under section (vii).
The combined eﬀect of these counterarguments make the interpretive decision a close call, but at the end of
the day, there appears to be no ready argument to overcome the Warner-Lambert interpretation based on
the complementarity of the language of sections (vii) and (viii). It would appear that with respect to patents
claiming uses for which an ANDA applicant is not seeking approval, the statute requires only a section
(viii) statement, possibly in connection with a Paragraph I certiﬁcation, but probably not a Paragraph IV
6221 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B).
6321 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
6421 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i)-(iii).
6521 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I) (certiﬁcation stating that “that such patent information [that is, the sort of patent infor-
mation whose existence is postulated in the preamble to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)] not been ﬁled”).





Having dealt with these preliminaries, the big question can ﬁnally be tackled: is a claim of induced infringe-
ment cognizable under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) when the drug use claimed in the patent at issue has not been
approved by the FDA? The statutory language of § 271(e)(2) reads:
It shall be an act of infringement to submit... an [ANDA] for a drug claimed in a patent or the use
of which is claimed in a patent... if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval under such
Act to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug... claimed in a patent or the
use of which is claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent.
The ﬁrst point to notice about the infringement provision is that it makes absolutely no mention of a
Paragraph IV certiﬁcation. This is a detail that appears to have inexplicably escaped the attention of most
of the courts that have analyzed the provision.66 For example, the district court in Allergan unabashedly
opines that “[i]t is the ﬁling of a Paragraph IV Certiﬁcation that puts into process the notice to the patentee
66See, e.g., Astra Aktiebolag v. Kremers Urban Development, 222 F. Supp. 2d 423, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Section
271(e)(2)(A) provides a patentee with a cause of action for patent infringement based solely upon the ﬁling of an ANDA
containing a Paragraph IV certiﬁcation implicating a plaintiﬀ’s patent rights.”); Purepac, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24219, at
*11-*12 (“An applicant proceeding by means of a section viii statement... does not face an infringement action under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(2)(A)”).
17allowing it to bring suit under Section 271(e)(2).”67 Indeed, even the Supreme Court, in its construal of the
statute in Ely Lilly, implies that the submission of a Paragraph IV certiﬁcation is an essential element of
the § 271(e)(2) infringement action.68
Of course, this is not to say that submission of a Paragraph IV certiﬁcation has no eﬀect on possible
infringement proceedings. On the contrary, as was detailed in Part I, when an infringement proceeding is
brought within 45 days of receipt of notice of a Paragraph IV certiﬁcation, that suit immediately triggers
a 30-month stay on approval of the underlying ANDA, unless the patent issue is found to be invalid before
that period has expired.69 The patentee who sues a generic drug manufacturer who has submitted no such
certiﬁcation cannot enjoy the obvious beneﬁts of the 30-month stay, and thus the generic drug of disputed
legitimacy may be FDA-approved and marketed even while the patent dispute is still pending (assuming, of
course, that such a suit can be brought in the ﬁrst place).70
Moreover, it is not surprising that a Paragraph IV certiﬁcation would get read into § 271(e)(2) considering
how such certiﬁcation inherently presupposes an applicant’s contemplation of commercial activity before the
expiration of a patent (even while asserting that the patent is invalid or otherwise will not be infringed by
such activity). Contrast the nature of certiﬁcations under Paragraphs I through III, none of which appears
on its face to disclose an intent (as required under § 271(e)(2)) “to engage in the commercial manufacture,
use, or sale of a drug... claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the expiration
of such patent.” For example, any company that decided to delay production of a generic drug until after
the expiration of an existing patent would presumably ﬁle under Paragraph III in the ﬁrst place. There is no
reason to think that such a company would be liable for infringement under § 271(e)(2). Up to this point,
67Allergan, F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
68Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 678 (“That is what is achieved by § 271(e)(2) — the creation of a highly artiﬁcial act of infringement
that consists of submitting an ANDA... containing the fourth type of certiﬁcation that is in error as to whether commercial
manufacture, use, or sale or the new drug... violates the relevant patent.”) (emphasis added).
6921 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
70See Purepac, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24219, at *11-*12 (noting that ANDAs submitted under section (viii) are not subject
to the notice requirements or the 30-month stay). Of course, these applicants cannot reap the beneﬁts of a possible 180-day
period of exclusivity, either. Id. at *12.
18then, there would appear to be no problem with the Paragraph IV incorporation interpretation.
In fact, the trouble with the interpretation becomes apparent only in a scenario precisely like the one under
general consideration in this paper. A generic company planning to sell an unpatented drug with certain
patented uses does not have to submit a Paragraph IV certiﬁcation to FDA (as was argued in Section B,
above) but nonetheless certainly plans “to engage in the commercial manufacture... of a drug... the use
of which is claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent,” as presumptively prohibited by §
271(e)(2). If a Paragraph IV certiﬁcation is a requirement for suit under § 271(e)(2), this patentee is out of
luck. But what reason can there be to read such a requirement into the statute to begin with? No court
even attempts to oﬀer any explanation.
Nor can the Ely Lilly restatement of § 271(e)(2) (which presumably started the Paragraph IV incorporation
trend) be cured by simply excising the reference to Paragraph IV. Such a reformulation of the Eli Lilly rule
would prohibit the submission of an ANDA “that is in error as to whether commercial manufacture, use, or
sale... [will] violate[] the relevant patent.”71 But where is the error in the ANDA in the hypothetical case
above, where the application is for a unpatented drug with some patented uses? When the ANDA applicant
states under section (viii) that the patent in question covers a use for which approval is not being sought,
such a statement is entirely true. However, whether or not the statement is true has no bearing on whether
the applicant’s activities might be considered inducement of infringement. Why deny the patentee’s claim
when the statute says nothing about requiring an “error”?
Fortunately, the Federal Circuit ultimately gets things right in Glaxo when it ignores the Supreme Court’s
gloss on § 271(e)(2) and asserts that the inquiry under Hatch-Waxman is “the same as it is in any other
71Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 678.
19infringement suit”: whether the patent is valid and (if so) whether the product that the ANDA applicant
is likely to market will infringe that patent. The interpretation succeeds (unsurprisingly) by not looking for
anything in § 271(e)(2) that was not there to begin with.72
2.
Antecedence Nonsense
Under Glaxo, it would thus appear that the hypothetical patentee can at least get into court to have its
inducement of infringement claim heard. In the Warner-Lambert opinion, however, the Federal Circuit panel
puts one ﬁnal spin on § 271(e)(2) that needs ﬁrst to be addressed. Recall once more that § 271(e)(2) prohibits
(under certain conditions) the submission of an ANDA for a drug “the use of which is claimed in a patent.”
Warner-Lambert interprets the phrase “the use” here to mean “the use for which the FDA has granted an
NDA.”73 Hence, under Warner-Lambert, a § 271(e)(2) infringement suit may be maintained with respect to
a drug use patent only where that drug use has been approved by the FDA.74
The Warner-Lambert panel explains that Congress’s choice of the word “the” before “use” is highly signif-
icant: “The words ‘the use’ require antecedent basis; thus ‘the use’ refers to a speciﬁc ‘use’ rather than a
previously undeﬁned ‘use.”’75 The panel ﬁnds an antecedent basis in 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i), a provision
requiring the ANDA applicant to “show that the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested
72For example, when § 271(e)(2) talks of “a drug... the use of which is claimed in a patent,” it implicitly requires as the
elements of liability a legitimate patent (validity) and a use that falls within the claims of that patent (infringement).
73Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1356.
74Id. (“[B]ecause an ANDA may not seek approval for an approved or oﬀ-label use of a drug... it necessarily follows that 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) does not apply to a use patent claiming only such a use.”).
75Id.
20in the labeling proposed for the new drug have been previously approved [under a prior NDA].”76 Such an
antecedent makes sense, the opinion explains, since when the FDA approves an ANDA, it only does so for
the speciﬁc use or uses permitted under the original NDA.77 The Warner-Lambert panel ﬁnally notes that
if Congress had intended a contrary meaning, they surely would have used “a” or “any” instead of “the” in
drafting the provision: “Congress could have been expected to use quite diﬀerent language if it wanted to
reach the opposite result.”78
All three members of the Allergan panel roundly criticize Warner-Lambert on this point, and with good
reason; indeed, determining the proper meaning of “the use” is perhaps the easiest interpretive issue touched
upon thus far in the paper.79 Judge Linn reasons that “[t]here is no indication that Congress deliberately
selected the deﬁnite article,” arguing that the “normal reading of ‘the use’ in this context is simply ‘any
use.”’80 Indeed, the idea that Congress intended to use the word “the” to make a reference to another
provision in such a far-removed location is patent nonsense (so to speak).81 Finally, the “Congress could
have said” argument, rejected when advanced against the Warner-Lambert plaintiﬀ in Section B, must be
rejected here as well. The emptiness of the debate tactic is made evident when Judge Schall ultimately
turns it against the Warner-Lambert panel, noting that Congress could have used the term “controlling





79Allergan, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6003, at *38 (Schall, J., concurring); Id. at *70-*72 (Linn, J., concurring).
80Id. at *70 (Linn, J., concurring).
81While Warner-Lambert urges that “the use” be read “in the context of the Act,” Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1356, an
examination of a print copy of the Hatch-Waxman Act ﬁnds “the use” and its purported antecedent basis at opposite ends of
that Act. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603
(1984) (showing the references on pages 1585 and 1603, respectively — eighteen pages apart in a twenty-page act).
82Allergan, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6003, at *39 (Schall, J., concurring).
21III.
The Conclusion: Compromise
Judge Linn’s most direct criticism for the Warner-Lambert panel comes when he accuses them of having
“ventured beyond our interpretive role and, in interpreting the complex statutory scheme... [allowing] policy
choices... to override the terms of the statute chosen by Congress.”83 Whether Judge Linn’s criticism is
rightly placed or not, the policy inquiry is one that courts routinely engage in when considering Hatch-
Waxman, and when they do, more often than not, the consciously chosen policy goal is, like that of Hatch-
Waxman itself, one of “compromise.”84
By the lights of compromise, the conclusions reached in this paper (though not determined by way of policy
analysis) come out looking pretty good. Pioneer manufacturers are allowed to list all patents applicable
to their drugs in the Orange Book to facilitate notice to the generics of those patents. The generics, in
turn, are not obliged to submit Paragraph IV certiﬁcations for those patents that disclose uses not approved
by the original NDA, thus escaping the notice requirements of Hatch-Waxman. To the extent that generic
companies overstep their bounds and begin subtly promoting still-patented uses to potential customers, they
can be held to answer in court for induced infringement. They will not, however, be automatically subject
to 30-month stays; injunctive relief barring sale of the generic drug will be available at the discretion of the
judge, and only through the traditional showing of irreparable harm, and so forth.
Consider, however, one ﬁnal bit of political advice that might be added to this analysis, oﬀered up from
83Id. at *69 (Linn, J., concurring).
84Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1358-59 (citing the Hatch-Waxman Act “compromise” and explaining how the plaintiﬀ’s
interpretations of the Act would upset that compromise).
22the direction from whence this paper started: copyright law. From the advent of the VCR down into the
Napster era, the trade associations representing the big copyright interests (e.g., the Recording Industry
Artists of America, the Motion Picture Association of America) have been doing battle with the owners and
distributors of technologies that are capable of and hence facilitate copyright violation. The lawsuits have
been legion,85 and they are ﬁercely fought by those who feel a certain injustice in the deprivation of a tool
that is, in fact, capable of legal, and legitimate uses. “Don’t go after us!” the opponents to the copyright
interests cry. “Go after the people who are actually stealing your stuﬀ!” But the cries are usually dismissed,
because the practical costs and diﬃculties in going after individual oﬀenders are perceived to be tremendous
when compared to the tactic of targeting middlemen instead.
In a matter of mere months, however, there has been a dramatic sea change. On April 3, 2003, the RIAA
served complaints on four college students found to have illegally downloaded and distributed thousands of
copyrighted works.86 The penalties requested were moderately high — some $98 billion in total damages87
— and, of course, many commentators complained that the RIAA should not be asking for such ridiculous
amounts, that they should not be picking on poor college students, etcetera.
On another level, of course, there seemed to be strangely little to complain about. These students had clearly
violated copyright law (no strained analysis in the realm of inducing or vicarious infringement required), and,
while they might not have thought they would get caught, they did, and the law is fairly clear regarding
penalties. Catching the students could not have required a terribly large amount of resources. Since the law
is clear, the litigation expenses will not be signiﬁcant (indeed, it seems exceedingly doubtful the cases will
85See, e.g., Corley, 273 F.3d at 429 (DVDs); Sony, 464 U.S. at 417 (VCRs); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004 (ﬁle-sharing software);
RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D. Wash. January 18, 2000) (music software); Sony
Computer Entertainment Am., Inc. v. GameMasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (video games); MGM Studios, Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6994 (April 25, 2003) (ﬁle-sharing software).
86See FindLaw News Document Archive, at http://news.ﬁndlaw.com/legalnews/documents/index.html (archiving copies of
the complaints against the four students)
87Andrew Tibbetts, RIAA sues two RPI students, PolyTechnic Online (April 30, 2003) at
http://poly.union.rpi.edu/article view.php3?view=2211&part=1. Of course, that is an amount generated for scare value; the
suits will likely settle for a minute fraction of that ﬁgure.
23ever go to trial). The ﬁle-trading tools are left available for those who want to use them, but it sent a strong
warning out to possible future oﬀenders. In short, it seems like it may just have been the most eﬀective
action taken by the copyright interests since the invention of the VCR.
Is there a lesson to be learned here for the pharmaceutical companies? In the middle of one unremarkable
pioneer/generic lawsuit like the others here considered, Judge Hochberg of the U.S. District Court of New
Jersey drops a helpful footnote.88 Noting ﬁrst that the defendants have “no control over doctors to absolutely
prevent them from writing an infringing prescription,” she goes on to point out that, “Indeed,... it is Plaintiﬀs
who have a large corps of drug salespersons who visit doctors regularly and can most readily police their
own patent.”89 Imagine, then, this scenario: four doctors are sued for having illegally prescribed a generic
drug for treating disease Y (a patented method of use for the drug). The law is clear. The expense is low.
The deterrence is high. And those who want to have access to a cheap generic drug for treating disease X
will still be able to get it.
Might not such an approach strike the best balance of all — maximizing the beneﬁts of use, and minimizing
the harms of abuse? It sounds like it might be a pretty good compromise.
88Organon, 244 F. Supp. 2d 370, n.13.
89Id.
24